A key component of the Third Offset Strategy proposed by the United States Department of Defense is the use of unmanned autonomous systems to deter potential conflicts. Collaborative autonomy technologies are also being explored by the private sector, which is rapidly pushing towards the deployment of self-driving vehicles. For areas affected by disaster, autonomous drone swarms can assist with search and rescue operations by surveilling large regions quickly without exposing emergency responders to risk prematurely. A substantial amount of progress has been made in distributed sensing research over the last few years. However, simulation results for applications that require complex inter-agent communications have rarely been demonstrated at scale; these simulations are generally executed using tens or hundreds of agents rather than the thousands or tens of thousands envisioned for large autonomous swarms. We address this deficit here by presenting two contributions. First, we extend our previous work on efficient, distributed algorithms for weak radiation source detection to accommodate the use case of surveillance across a very wide area. We then demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed algorithms at scale using a parallelized version of the ns-3 discrete event simulator.
INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of the Cold War, the United States Department of Defense has pursued various "offset strategies" to counter the numerical advantages of its adversaries. It is currently investigating the roles that artificial intelligence and autonomy will have in preventing future conflicts as part of its Third Offset Strategy. 1 The private sector is also interested in collaborative autonomy technologies and is expected to replace conventional, human-driven vehicles with self-driving ones in the near future. Such vehicles are already being tested on the roads today, co-mingling with existing traffic. For areas beset by natural or man-made disasters, the use of autonomous drone swarms has been proposed for search and rescue operations; drone swarms can potentially surveil large regions quickly without exposing emergency responders to risk prematurely. We consider one such application for this paper: the detection of a weak radioactive source using a swarm of mobile, autonomous sensor platforms distributed across a wide geographical area.
The problem of detecting a radioactive source via a network of low-cost sensors rather than a specialized, monolithic sensor has received significant attention in the literature. [2] [3] [4] [5] While the proposed approaches have been shown to be effective, they generally rely on a centralized data fusion center to aggregate information from multiple nodes and formulate a global detection decision. Centralized approaches may not be practical for all applications of interest, however. For example, a sensor network operating in a hostile environment may suffer losses due to hardware failure or deliberate anti-access/area denial countermeasures. A fusion center represents a single point of failure, the loss of which would render the entire network inoperable. As such, it is often preferable to employ a decentralized approach when attrition is expected. Collaborative autonomous networks are also vulnerable to Byzantine attacks. 6, 7 Byzantines nodes are insider threats that appear to the rest of the network as legitimate members, yet intentionally introduce falsified data to disrupt the system. Given the rising prevalence of cyber warfare, it is reasonable to expect that at some point, an adversary may be able to compromise one or more sensor nodes and convert them into Byzantines.
In Ref. 8 , we introduced a distributed algorithm for weak radioactive source detection that is also resistant to Byzantine attacks. The goal of this paper is to expand our previous work to a larger scale and model it using the ns-3 discrete-event network simulator.
9 Notionally, the scenario we are describing is the detection of a single radioactive source in a 10 km x 10 km x 3 km region of interest using a heterogeneous collection of one thousand airborne sensor platforms. ns-3 was chosen for this task because it compares favorably to other simulation tools, 10 has been demonstrated to handle planetary-scale simulations with a billion nodes, 11 and is used extensively in research and educational environments. The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we introduce the system model and set up the detection problem. Next, we review the simulation framework and the computing hardware used to run it. We then show the results of the simulations across test cases with and without Byzantines present. Finally, we discuss the path forward and provide closing remarks.
SYSTEM MODEL
To set up the detection problem, consider two hypotheses: the null hypothesis H 0 , indicating the absence of a radioactive source, and the alternative hypothesis H 1 , indicating the presence of such a source. Assuming a network of N observer nodes, let z i , the sensor measurement at node i, be given by
under hypothesis H 0 , and
under hypothesis H 1 . c i , b i , and w i correspond to the source radiation count, background radiation count, and measurement noise, respectively. The source radiation count is Poisson distributed with rate λ ci , given by
where I s is the intensity of the source, {X s , Y s , Z s } denote the position of the source, and {X i , Y i , Z i } correspond to the position of the observer. The background radiation count is also Poisson distributed with rate λ b , and the measurement noise is Gaussian distributed with zero mean and variance σ 2 w . It was shown in Ref. 4 that this model can be approximated using a Gaussian distribution:
where I s , and thus λ ci , equals zero under H 0 and some positive value under H 1 .
In Ref. 8 , we showed that when the radioactive source is weak, λ ci tends to zero, and the locally-optimal test statistic for the system becomes 1
for some detection threshold γ, where the individual test statistic of each node, f (z i ), is given by
To obtain the system-wide test statistic in a decentralized manner, we apply the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM); 12 individual test statistics are propagated across the network through multiple rounds of information sharing. At round k, let the state value of node i be given by
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We refer to this approach here as the traditional ADMM, or simply ADMM.
We consider a slightly modified form of the ADMM to deal with potential Byzantine attackers. Let a Byzantine node j behave like a standard observer, with one exception: rather than sharing its true state value x k j during round k, the Byzantine falsifies its data by appending Gaussian noise with mean µ B and variance σ 2 B to its state value and shares that instead. In Ref. 8 , we introduced a robust version of the ADMM, abbreviated as R-ADMM, to mitigate this type of attack. At round k, let the state value of node i be given by
and let α
That is, we replace the summation of state values across local neighbor nodes with a new operator, Γ p . The behavior of this operator is as follows: In other words, Γ p discards the top and bottom values as potential outliers and replaces them with the average of the remaining values. When |N i | ≤ 2p, however, this operation is undefined. Instead, revert to the summation used by the traditional ADMM.
SIMULATION FRAMEWORK
To obtain the results presented in this paper, we conducted a series of Monte Carlo simulations on Quartz, a high-performance computing cluster located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Quartz features 2634 compute nodes with 36 cores and 128 GB of memory per node, and has a theoretical peak performance of 3251.4 TFLOPS. The simulation was developed using ns-3 version 3.27. Over 50 GB of simulation results were generated in ns-3, then formatted, analyzed, and plotted in MATLAB. The simulation scenario consists of one target node and one thousand observer nodes randomly distributed across a 10 km x 10 km x 3 km region of interest. While the target was placed on the ground, observers were set at altitudes ranging from 10 m to 3 km, notionally representing an airborne search conducted via heterogenous platforms. Each observer was limited to a 5 km communications range. To establish the network, bidirectional point-to-point links were created for each pair of observers, forming a complete graph. The position of each node was randomized between successive Monte Carlo runs, and network links were brought up or down depending on the distance between the pair of observers. Building a network in this manner enables parallel simulation using the distributed ns-3 scheme presented in Ref. 13 . However, the requirement that the entire network topology be stored on every MPI rank is problematic in the case of many observers N , as the number of links created for a complete graph is N (N − 1)/2. Partitioning and distributing the network across multiple ranks 11, 14 is infeasible as well since topology depends on the randomized positions of the observers and therefore changes from run to run. During the course of our experiments, we found that insufficient memory was causing the simulation to run slower than expected. We are currently developing a memory-efficient shared channel solution as a workaround, but for this paper, we decided to use direct memory inspection to disseminate state information instead. Coarse parallelism was achieved by splitting the Monte Carlo runs across multiple compute nodes.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we investigate the performance of the proposed system experimentally. First, we show that the traditional ADMM-based approach converges to the optimal, centralized result within a reasonable number of rounds, and provide receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves illustrating detector performance at various source intensities. Next, we explore how the introduction of a single Byzantine attacker can affect the performance of the system. We then demonstrate how R-ADMM can be used to improve performance when Byzantines are present. Finally, we show that R-ADMM does not result in a significant performance penalty versus the traditional approach. For all cases, λ b = 0.5, σ 2 w = 0.5, and ρ = 1. Each hypothesis was tested over 1000 Monte Carlo runs, and information sharing was limited to 100 rounds per run. Fig. 1 shows the probability of convergence as a function of the number of rounds when using the traditional ADMM. We define convergence as the point where all observer nodes have achieved state values within ±1% of their collective mean (i.e., the variance between state values becomes sufficiently small). From the results, we see that only 20-30% of the Monte Carlo runs demonstrated system-wide convergence after 20 rounds, depending on the intensity of the source. This number climbed sharply after 25 rounds, reaching 80% or higher after 30 rounds, and virtually all of the runs were found to have converged after 40 rounds. Higher intensity values required more time for the network to converge. While this may seem counterintuitive at first, as stronger radiation sources should be easier to detect, recall from Eq. (4) that increasing the source intensity also increases the variance of the measurements. Thus, more time is needed to balance state values across the entire network. Fig . 2 shows the probability that all nodes exhibit no more than some maximum amount of deviation from the optimal, centralized test statistic given by Eq. (5) at the time of convergence. Over 90% of the runs had maximum deviation values of 5% or less at the source intensities tested here, and nearly all runs had deviation values within 10%. This can also be seen in Fig. 3 , as the ROC curves for I s ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5} show that decentralized detection performance is nearly indistinguishable from that of a centralized detector. Note that although higher intensity values may result in longer convergence times, the performance of the detector was better overall, as expected.
The introduction of a Byzantine attacker can create significant problems for the traditional ADMM. Fig. 4 shows the ROC curves for I s = 0.5 when a Byzantine node with µ B ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and σ 2 B = 0.1 is present. As can be seen, detection performance decreases as the strength of the attacker increases. This is a powerful result: a single compromised node can potentially degrade the performance of the entire system until it becomes no more than a simple coin flip detector. However, R-ADMM is able to mitigate some of this performance loss; Fig. 5 shows ROC curves for both the traditional and robust approaches when I s = 0.5, µ B = 3, and σ 2 B = 0.1. In smaller networks, such as the ten node example we presented in Ref. 8 , the effects of R-ADMM are even more pronounced, as each Byzantine accounts for a greater proportional share of the total information.
Finally, Figs. 6-8 show the probability of convergence, probability of meeting the deviation limit, and ROC curves, respectively, when using R-ADMM for I s ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5} without any Byzantine nodes. Like the traditional ADMM example, convergence was in the 20-30% range after 20 rounds, and nearly all runs converged by 40 rounds. There was greater deviation from the optimal, centralized test statistic at all source intensities, with a more pronounced effect at higher intensities. Given that the R-ADMM operator replaces the highest and lowest neighbor state values with the mean of the remaining values, some loss is to be expected when no Byzantines are present, as the extremities are legitimate values and thus should factor into the calculation of the global test statistic. However, this loss was generally small, observed to be on the order of roughly 5% or less in terms of probability of detection at a given probability of false alarm.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we described a distributed radiation detection scheme using collaborative autonomous sensors and showed its performance at scale using the ns-3 discrete-event network simulator. We also demonstrated its performance in the presence of a Byzantine attacker, and showed that a robust variant of the algorithm can mitigate the effects of such an attack. For our future work, we are planning to improve the memory efficiency of ns-3 so that we can scale the simulation up to tens of thousands of nodes and incorporate dynamic communications channels that are affected by propagation loss and other real-world phenomena. Figure 8 . Performance of the robust ADMM-based approach versus the optimal, centralized case at various source intensities.
